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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
I'll ml ill/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL LEROY MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
( ,isi' Nn MMM1IW0 < A 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
I- I- * 
-•• iniSDICTION AND II III! Ill IIUI RE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from, the interlocutory order of] udge John R. Morris in the 
Utah Second Distiict Court, Weber County, denying defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence in a luminal prosecution, i -.L> e^uu nas jurisdiction undu Liah L ^ J I 
^ > - * • , ) . . , • 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 Did Utah Code Ann. t$ 4 i -t>-1 tmi W es t 2ui>4 MI p. aled, 2005) limit a police 
o 11 icn's authority to arrosl IOI misdemeanor (railU \ uilations:'1 
correctness. See State v. Lusk, 2001 UT ±02,
 R x ,^ 37 l\3d 1103. 
1
 The legislature repealed section 41-6-166 during the 2005 legislative session. 
See 2005 Utah Laws 209. ' 
2. Did defendant's resistance to an allegedly unlawful arrest constitute a 
new, distinct crime for which he was lawfully arrested and searched incident 
thereto? 
Standard of Review. This issue is raised for the first time on appeal as an 
alternate ground on which to affirm the trial court. Thus, no standard of review 
applies. This Court may affirm on an alternate ground so long as the ground is 
apparent in the record. State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96,117 n.4,89 P.3d 185. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) (repealed 2005), attached as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with various drug and weapon offenses 
including possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, resisting arrest, and running a red light 
(R. 1-2). Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing and entered pleas of 
not guilty (R. 21-22,23-24). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the drug and drug paraphernalia 
evidence seized during a search incident to his arrest for a traffic violation (R. 30-
31). He asserted that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) governs arrests for 
2 
f ra f 111 \r i i > 1 o fi n 11 s a n (I 111,11 h i' >, 11' rest for r 111 I 11 i n ^  < i n M 1 1 i ght i/v as not ai ithorizerf by 
that section (R. 30-31). 
After a hearing and briefing, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 49-
59). Tt ruled that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-166 did not limit the authority of police to 
arrest a person for a traffic offense, u v^ iiiy prescribed pri^edures the police must 
fol l()i x oi Lee tl ie) n lake sucl L ai i ai rest (R 55 56). 
I Wend.in I l i l rd i prl ihon iiini 111 ^ Ulnh Siipuvmr < mil l 1 in pennisM iiiii 1 
appeal the trial court's denial oi lab suppression motion (R, 65). That court 
transferred the case to this court pursuant to its transfer authority in Ltah eodc 
Ann, § 78-2-2(4) (West 2004) (R. 69). Defendant's petition raised the same claim he 
asserted m I he trial court—ihut iiibdiivht tor atraffu \ lulduon was unlaw ml under 
t -1 *-!, -. 1 *\ • - - l t. i- . • i. »"*•',. •
 s ^ r a j 4 - •ii 
l s s u e Q£ £|rsj. imp r e s s ion that warranted interlocutory review. This Court granted 
defendant's petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On f li, I 1 "»ni)| ii>cnl<. C I I M - J I I I W . i l .m iln |M1II .Dili i ml \\v\ f 111 
Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force, were surveilling a suspected drug house 
from unmarked police vehicles in a school parking lot (R. 79:10-11,28). The agents 
observed some short-term traffic to the house, including defendant on a motorcycle 
3 
(R. 79:11). A few minutes after arriving at the house, defendant returned to his 
motorcycle and drove across the street to the school parking lot opposite the house 
(R. 79:12,29). He circled the parking lot on his motorcycle and stared at the agents 
(R. 79:14,29). As he left the parking lot and returned to the house, defendant failed 
to stop at a stop sign and signaled incorrectly (R. 79:14-15, 30). 
After a couple of minutes in the house, defendant again returned to his 
motorcycle and drove off (R. 79:15, 30). Agent Johnson followed defendant (R. 
79:17,30). Defendant turned right at a red light without signaling and without first 
stopping at the light (R. 79:31). He stopped his motorcycle in the traffic lane after 
completing the turn and glanced back at Agent Johnson (R. 79-31). Defendant then 
continued on his way (R. 79:31). 
Agent Johnson activated his emergency lights and pulled defendant over (R. 
79:31). As Agent Johnson and defendant were talking on the sidewalk, agents Weiss 
and Grogan arrived (R. 79:34). Agent Weiss noticed a large sheath knife on 
defendant's side, which he removed with defendant's permission (R. 79:17, 34). 
Defendant also handed over a four-inch butterfly knife that was in his back pocket 
(R. 79:17, 34). An additional large sheath knife was found attached to defendant's 
motorcycle (R. 79:17, 35). 
The agents decided to arrest defendant in lieu of issuing a citation (R. 79:17-
18,33). Agent Grogan later testified that he had no reason to suspect that defendant 
4 
would not show up to court on a citation (R. 79:25). He stated, however, that he 
usually arrests people rather than a-u- them if they "commit numerous traffic 
violations" (R. 79:24-25). 
-V> soon as the agents indicated that they were going to arrest defendant -or 
continued to try to back up (R. 79:18). As the other agents handcuffed defendai it, 
Agent Johnson noticed a large bulge in the waistband of defendant's pants (R. 79:18, 
T^ V Agent Johnson feared it might be a weapon ,\no informed the other agents that 
defendant had ^onuAiiing m i\\^ pants ,i\ • * le asked defendant vxlmi ^ r 
; , : • • - * . . , i began ^ : urfc,L;ii:.g 
trvimT to conceal the bulge fR. 79:34). Defendant also tried to drop lo the ground [R. 
79:18). ' 
Agent Johnson unbuckled defendant's belt and removed a black pouch from 
/,x-> ,-, .;i:*.iL\r.id .Wv.i .«* . *• . • •• -ii^iui Lie j.--vMiv^  were two glass pipes and a 
rylimler tube v iilllli i llh'iilMMI iii llii HIIIIIII mini I nin iill i c n l u r insitli IN "" l11'1 »dl 
Agent Johnson ^^Hrnizod tho objects as pipes for smoking metham phetam ii l e (R 
79:36). He also discovered two bags of methamphetamine and a bag of marijuana 
(R. 79:19, 36). 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) (repealed 2005) did not limit an 
officer's authority to arrest a misdemeanor traffic offender. It merely prescribed 
post-arrest procedures guaranteeing the offender a quick appearance before a 
magistrate. 
Even if section 41-6-166 did limit an officer's authority to arrest for a 
misdemeanor traffic offense, defendant's arrest and the search incident thereto were 
still lawful. By resisting the allegedly unlawful arrest, defendant committed a new, 
distinct crime of resisting arrest. This new crime gave officers probable cause to 
arrest defendant, and the subsequent search was therefore lawful. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-166 DID NOT LIMIT A POLICE 
OFFICER'S AUTHORITY TO ARREST FOR A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION; IT MERELY PRESCRIBED POST-ARREST 
PROCEDURES 
Defendant asserts Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (West 2004) (repealed 2005) 
restricted an officer's authority to arrest for a traffic violation to the four 
circumstances listed in that statute. Br. Aplt. at 4. He claims that because none of 
the circumstances were present at his arrest, the officers had no authority to arrest 
him and that their search of his person incident to arrest was therefore unlawful. Br. 
Aplt. at 4. Defendant's claim is meritless. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that arrests for misdemeanor traffic 
violations are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Atwater v. City ofLago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318,354 (2001). It remains the prerogative of the legislature, however, 
to restrict an officer's authority to arrest misdemeanor offenders. Thus, defendant's 
claim is strictly one of statutory interpretation—did section 41-6-166 limit an 
officer's authority to arrest for misdemeanor traffic violations? This Court reviews 
that question for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's ruling. See State 
v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, f 11,37 P.3d 1103. 
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate 
the Legislature's intent.'" State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (citation 
omitted). The Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain 
7 
language of the statute. Id. If possible, the statutory language should be given a 
literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the 
plain language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look further. See Visitor 
Auth. Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Div., 930 P.2d 1196,1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the 
statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the 
uncertain facts of legislative history/'); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. 
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction." (citation and quotations omitted)). A reviewing court should not add 
or subtract statutory terms. See Reinkraut v. Shalala, 854 F.Supp. 838, 841 (D. Utah 
1994). "Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the meaning of the statute from its 
very language, and if it is straightforward, we simply enforce it according to its 
terms. Its words then bear 'their original meaning and the statute is not to be read 
so as to add or subtract from [that] which is stated . . . ' " Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 
89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 stated the following: 
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this act 
punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of 
setting bond, shall in the following cases, be taken without unnecessary 
delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense 
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of 
such offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the 
place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases: 
8 
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance 
before a magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
or any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in Section 41-6-44. 
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in 
the event of an accident causing death, personal injuries, or damage to 
property. 
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his 
written promise to appear in court as hereinafter provided, or when in 
the discretion of the arresting officer, a written promise to appear is 
insufficient. 
By its plain language, the statute only applied "[wjhenever any person is 
arrested/7 Id. Additionally, the four conditions in the statute applied "[w]hen the 
person is arrested/7 Id. The statute thus assumed that an arrest had already 
occurred. Moreover, the statute stated that its procedures exist "for the purpose of 
setting bond/7 Id. Thus, the statute's directives did not govern when police may 
arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation. They governed when and how police 
may seek a bond in lieu of a promise to appear before releasing an arrested suspect. 
Consideration of other statutes governing arrests and misdemeanor traffic 
violations supports this construction. Blanket authority for police to arrest a 
misdemeanor suspect is found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (West 2004), which 
states the following: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or 
may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
9 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence 
of any peace officer; 'presence7 includes all of the physical senses or 
any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any 
physical sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses 
"The term 'public offense' under section 77-7-2(1) generally includes 
misdemeanors." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, % 29,57 P.3d 1052. Violations of chapter 
six of the traffic code are class C misdemeanors unless otherwise indicated. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-12(1) (West 2004) ("A violation of any provision of this 
chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided."). Traffic violations 
thus constitute a "public offense" for which officers may arrest a person under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1), unless prohibited by a more specific statute.2 
Section 41-6-166 was not that more specific statute. It was part of a statutory 
scheme that governed police procedure following an arrest for a misdemeanor 
traffic violation. Section 166 states that police must take an arrested suspect to "the 
nearest or most accessible" magistrate to set bond in four circumstances: (1) when 
the suspect requests it; (2) when the suspect is arrested for driving under the 
influence; (3) when the suspect is arrested for fleeing the scene of an accident; and 
(4) when the person refuses to sign the promise to appear described in section 167 or 
2
 The legislature renumbered the traffic code in the 2005 legislative session. 
See 2005 Utah Laws 11-208. Most of the traffic code is now found in chapter 6a of 
title 41. 
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the officer believes that promise to appear will be insufficient. See Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-166. It dovetails with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-167 (West 2004), which describes 
the procedures for releasing a suspect without taking him before a magistrate.3 That 
section states, in part, the following: 
(1) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, 
whenever a person is [not] immediately taken before a magistrate as 
hereinbefore provided, the peace officer shall prepare, in triplicate or 
more copies, a written notice to appear in court . . . 
(4) (a) In order to secure release as provided in this section, the 
arrested person shall promise to appear in court by signing at least one 
copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer. 
(b) The arresting officer shall immediately: 
(i) deliver a copy of the notice to the person promising to appear; and 
(ii) release the person arrested from custody. 
(5) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section shall be: 
(a) guilty of misconduct in office; and 
(b) subject to removal from office. 
3
 The legislature renumbered section 41-6-167 in the 2005 legislative session. 
It is now found in section 77-7-24. See 2005 Utah Laws 203. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-167 (West 2004).4 
Neither of these sections purported to limit the authority found in section 77-
7-2(1) for an officer to arrest misdemeanor offenders. To the contrary, they 
contemplated that an officer may arrest a traffic offender, transport him to the police 
station, photograph him, fingerprint him, and then arraign him before a magistrate 
or release him with a promise to appear. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169 (West 2004) 
(repealed 2005) confirmed this interpretation. It stated that sections 166 and 167 
"shall govern all peace officers in making arrests without warrant for violations of 
this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive of any 
other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an 
offense of like grade/7 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169 (emphasis added). In other 
words, section 77-7-2(1) still applies to misdemeanor traffic violations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also suggested that section 166 was properly 
construed as governing police procedure post-arrest, In Woytko v. Browning, 659 
P.2d 1058,1060 (Utah 1983), it noted that the section 41-6-166 serves two purposes. 
4
 The word "not" inserted in brackets was included in the original bill 
enacting section 41-6-167, but was omitted in the engrossed bill. Compare 1941 Utah 
Laws 149 with 1949 Utah Laws 186. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
the only rational view of the statute is that it applies when a suspect is not 
immediate^ taken before a magistrate. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1200 n.6 
(Utah 1995). 
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"First, it preserves the rights of a person arrested by insuring that he be afforded a 
prompt opportunity to effect his release from custody/' Id. "Second, it prevents the 
arresting officer from being selective in determining before which magistrate the 
charge will be lodged and tried." Id. Thus, the statute enumerates the rights of 
arrested suspects to a speedy, impartial arraignment before a magistrate. It does 
not, as defendant claims, limit the authority granted officers by section 77-7-2 to 
arrest misdemeanor traffic offenders. Accordingly, defendant's arrest was proper, 
and the trial court correctly denied his motion to suppress. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS RESISTANCE TO 
ARREST CONSTITUTED A NEW, DISTINCT CRIME FOR WHICH 
OFFICERS ARRESTED AND SEARCHED HIM 
Even if this Court were to hold that defendant's arrest was improper under 
section 41-6-166, it should nevertheless affirm the trial court because defendant 
resisted arrest, creating a new, distinct crime for which officers lawfully arrested 
and searched him.5 
Evidence seized following an unlawful arrest or detention is normally 
excluded from the subsequent criminal trial as fruit of the illegal arrest. See Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). Utah courts have recognized an 
5
 Although this argument was not raised by the State below, this Court may 
affirm the trial court on any ground apparent in the record. See State v. Hechtle, 2004 
UT App 96, \ 17 n.4, 89 P.3d 185. 
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exception to the rule, however, where the suspect's response to the illegal arrest or 
detention is itself a new crime that gives officers cause to arrest and search the 
suspect. See State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003,1008-09 (Utah 1997) (holding that Griego 
was lawfully arrested for assault on an officer even though assault was in response 
to illegal entry into his home); State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 1311,1312-13 (Utah App. 
1993) (holding that where officers illegally seized defendant and his marijuana, 
evidence that defendant swallowed marijuana was nevertheless admissible at trial 
for evidence tampering). 
Other jurisdictions to consider the question have also held that when the 
suspect's response to the illegal arrest or detention is itself a new crime, it gives 
officers cause to lawfully arrest and search the suspect. See United States v. Sprinkle, 
106 F.3d 613, 619 (4th Cir. 1997) (admitting evidence where, after unlawful Terry 
stop, defendant assaulted police officers with a firearm); United States v. Dawdy, 46 
F.3d 1427,1431 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[Assuming arguendo that [the officer's initial stop 
and arrest of Dawdy were invalid, Dawdy's resistance provided independent 
grounds for his arrest, and the evidence discovered in the subsequent searches of his 
person . . . is admissible); United States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192,1196 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(refusing to suppress evidence that Pryor used a false social security number where 
he provided officers with false personal information during an illegal detention); 
United States v. Waupekenay, 973 F.2d 1533, 1538 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Evidence of a 
14 
separate, independent crime initiated against police officers in their presence after 
an illegal entry or arrest will not be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment."); 
United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230,1235 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that border 
patrol agent's illegal entry into suspect's car did not taint subsequent search of 
suspect where, before search, suspect illegally fled inspection area); United States v. 
King, 724 F.2d 253, 256 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that officer's illegal traffic stop did 
not taint subsequent search where suspects, in response to illegal stop, assaulted 
officer); United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1016-17 (11th Cir. 1983) 
("[Notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between lawless police 
conduct and a defendant's response, if the defendant's response is itself a new, 
distinct crime, the police constitutionally may arrest the defendant for that crime."); 
United States v. Marine, 51 M.J. 425, (C.A.A.F. 1999) (refusing to suppress marijuana 
cigarette seized from solider who, during illegal detention, violated military law by 
disrespecting an officer); Commonwealth v. King, 449 N.E.2d 1217,1226 (Mass. 1983) 
(refusing to suppress evidence seized where suspect shot at officers during an illegal 
traffic stop); State v. Nelson, 519 S.E.2d 786,790 (S.C. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that 
officer's initial unlawful attempt to stop suspect became lawful when suspect 
committed traffic infractions); Woodson v. Commw., 429 S.E.2d 27, 29 (Va. 1993) 
(refusing to suppress cocaine and marijuana seized during stop that was initially 
illegal but during which suspect assaulted police officer). 
15 
United States v. Bailey is illustrative of this principal and analogous to the 
instant case. Bailey was detained by narcotics agents in the Atlanta, Georgia airport 
on suspicion of drug trafficking. Bailey, 691 F.2d at 1011. Before the agents could 
transport Bailey for questioning, Bailey fled custody. Id. at 1012. One of the agents 
pursued Bailey and caught him. Id. The two engaged in a fistfight and a struggle 
for possession of the agent's firearm. Id. Aft,er subduing Bailey, the officer searched 
him and discovered a large sum of money and quantities of cocaine and heroin. Id. 
On appeal to the eleventh circuit, Bailey claimed that the money and drugs were 
fruit of the illegal detention in the airport. Id. at 1013. The court disagreed and held 
that police lawfully arrested defendant for a new distinct crime. Id. at 1016-17. It 
explained, "[Notwithstanding a strong causal connection in fact between lawless 
police conduct and a defendant's response, if the defendant's response is itself a 
new, distinct crime, the police constitutionally may arrest the defendant for that 
crime." Id. 
The Bailey court also found substantial policy considerations supporting an 
exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a suspect commits an 
new crime during an unlawful stop. "A contrary rule would virtually immunize a 
defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient 
causal connection to the police misconduct." Id. at 1017. "[Extending the fruits 
doctrine to immunize a defendant from arrest for new crimes gives a defendant an 
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intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts so long as they are 
sufficiently connected to the chain of causation started by the police misconduct/7 
Id. Extending the fruits doctrine to new crimes committed during an unlawful 
detention would allow suspects to resist arrest, assault officers, and even murder 
officers with impunity, so long as the initial detention was unlawful. 
In the instant case, even assuming arguendo that the initial arrest was invalid, 
defendant's resistance to the arrest was a new, distinct crime for which officers 
arrested and searched him. Defendant has no right to resist an arrest, even an 
unlawful one. See State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568,573-74 (Utah 1991) (holding that 
common law right to resist unlawful arrest had been abolished by legislature in 
favor of statutory scheme that prohibited assault upon a police officer acting within 
the scope of his duty). Accordingly, the agents search of defendant after he resisted 
arrest was lawful. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
Respectfully submitted September 14,2005. 
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§ 4 1 - 6 - 1 6 6 . Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor—Setting bond 
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this ac t l punishable as a 
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the 
following cases, be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within 
the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and 
who has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most accessible with 
reference to the place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a 
magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
combination thereof as prescribed in Section 41-6-44. 
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event 
of an accident causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property. 
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written 
promise to appear in court as hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of 
the arresting officer, a written promise to appear is insufficient. 
Laws 1941, c. 52, § 149; Laws 1975, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 7, § 1; Laws 1979, c. 242, § 72; 
Laws 1992, c. 30, § 88. 
Codifications C. 1943, § 57-7-226. 
1
 Laws 1941, c. 52 that enacted this chapter. 
Addendum B 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDENDEPARTMENT, STATE OFUT^H'U" : - I A C: 31~ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
MICHAEL LEROY MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING DE 
Judge John R. Morris 
Case No. 041904034 
This case is before the court on a motion to suppress. 
FACTS 
Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force agents Grogen and Johnson testified at the suppression 
hearing. 
On the night of June 16,2004, Agents Grogen and Johnson were conducting surveillance of 
an Ogden house following complaints of drug trafficking. The agents set up in a school parking lot 
across the street from the house with two other agents. The agents were not in uniform and each 
drove an unmarked vehicle. 
During the course of the evening, the agents observed Martinez leave the house under 
surveillance on a motorcycle. Martinez crossed the street to the parking lot, circled the agents, then 
committed several traffic violations while returning to the house, namely, failing to stop at a stop 
sign and giving a right hand turn signal while turning left. 
After several minutes, Martinez left the house a second time and proceeded to drive the 
motorcycle eastbound on Harrison Boulevard. Agent Johnson followed, and observed further traffic 
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violations by Martinez-failing to stop pursuant to a traffic control device and turning without 
signaling- at the intersection of 20th Street and Harrison Boulevard. 
Agent Johnson initiated a traffic stop. Martinez stopped the motorcycle and dismounted. 
Shortly thereafter, Agents Grogen and Weiss arrived at the scene. Agent Johnson stepped away to 
check for a valid license and registration and outstanding warrants. Agent Grogen informed Martinez 
that he was under arrest for the observed traffic violations. Martinez backed up as though attempting 
to get away, but was restrained and handcuffed by Agents Grogen and Weiss. 
Believing that his assistance in restraining Martinez might be needed, Agent Johnson re-
approached Mairtinez, Grogen and Weiss. Agent Johnson observed a large bulge in the front 
waistband area of Martinez pants. When initially stopped, Martinez had been carrying a large sheath 
knife and a butterfly knife. Agent Johnson asked Martinez what was in his pants. Agent Johnson 
testified that he was concerned that the bulge might be a concealed weapon. Martinez began to 
struggle and made an effort to hide the bulge from view. Agent Johnson searched Martinez and 
removed a black case or pouch from Martinez' waistband area, which was found to contain drug 
paraphernalia and substances appearing to be marijuana and methamphetamine. 
Martinez was subsequently booked and charged by information with, among other things, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii). 
ANALYSIS 
Martinez asks the court to suppress the evidence obtained upon search on the ground that a 
peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation is limited by Utah Code Ann. 
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§§41-6-166,-167 and -169. Martinez also argues that the arrest was improper since it was motivated 
by the agents' desire to search Martinez and his motorcycle, and that an arrest for a misdemeanor 
traffic violation should fail on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
A peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation 
was raised but not decided in State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Harmon, the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that sections 166 and 167 apply only to arrests for violations of title 41, 
chapter 6, and therefore did not apply to the violation for which Harmon was arrested. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for 
misdemeanor speeding violations without examination of section 41-6-166. United States v. Lugo, 
170 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1999). 
Statutory Authority to Arrest 
Martinez asserts that a peace officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation 
is limited by sections 41-6-166, -167 and -169. Those sections provide: 
41-6-166. Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor-Setting bond. 
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this [chapter 6]1 punishable as a 
misdemeanor, the arrested person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases, be 
taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged 
is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most 
accessible with reference to the place where said arrest is made, in any of the following cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in 
Section 41-6-44. 
1
 "... the reference to 'this act' should now properly be read 'this chapter,' meaning chapter 6." 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1201. 
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(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident 
causing death, personal injuries, or damage to property. 
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear 
in court as hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the arresting officer, a written promise 
to appear is insufficient. 
41-6-167. Notice to appear in court-Contents-Promise to compIy-Signing-Release from 
custody -Official misconduct. 
(1) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, whenever a person is [not]2 
immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided, the peace officer shall prepare, in 
triplicate or more copies, a written notice to appear in court containing: 
(a) the name and address of the person; 
(b) the number, if any, of the person's operator's license; 
(c) the registration number of the person's vehicle; 
(d) the offense charged; and 
(e) the time and place the person shall appear in court. 
(2) The time specified in the notice to appear must be at least five days after the arrest of the 
person unless the person demands an earlier hearing. 
(3) The place specified in the notice to appear shall be made before a magistrate of competent 
jurisdiction in the county in which the alleged violation occurred. 
(4) (a) In order to secure release as provided in this section, the arrested person shall promise 
to appear in court by signing at least one copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer. 
(b) The arresting officer shall immediately: 
(i) deliver a copy of the notice to the person promising to appear; and 
"The word cnot5 was included in the original 1941 bill but was accidentally omitted when the 
bill was enrolled. See 1941 Utah Laws 139; 1949 Utah Laws 186. We have previously held that 
'the only logical reading of the statute is that it has application only when a citation is issued in 
lieu of an arrest and no appearance is made before a magistrate.' Woytko v. Browning, 659 P.2d 
1058, 1061 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute should read 'whenever a person is 
not immediately taken before a magistrate.'" Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1200, fn 6. 
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(ii) release the person arrested from custody. 
(5) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section shall be: 
(a) guilty of misconduct in office; and 
(b) subject to removal from office. 
41-6-169. Arrests without warrants. 
The foregoing provisions of this act shall govern all peace officers in making arrests without 
warrant for violations of this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive 
of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of 
like grade. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-166, -167, 169. 
Martinez contends that arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations are authorized in only the 
four specific circumstances enumerated in section 166: (1) when the person arrested demands to see 
a magistrate, (2) when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, 
(3) when arrested for hit and run, or (4) when the person arrested refuses to sign the promise to 
appear contained in the citation or when, in the discretion of the officer, the written promise to 
appear is insufficient. 
For all misdemeanor traffic violations not within these four circumstances, Martinez argues 
that section 169 gives peace officers authority only to issue a citation under section 167, after which 
the suspect must be released. 
However, neither sections 166,167,169 nor the other provisions of title 41, chapter 6 confer 
arrest authority on peace officers. That authority is found in Utah's general statute governing arrests, 
which provides that "a peace officer ... may, without warrant, arrest a person:... (I) for any public 
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offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer...." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the authority to issue citations for misdemeanor traffic violations (other than 
parking violations under section 41-6-19.5) is not found in those sections or anywhere in chapter 6. 
That authority is also found in the general arrest statute: "A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person 
into custody ... may issue and deliver a citation requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution 
on a misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before whom the 
person should be taken pursuant to law if the person had been arrested." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-18 
(emphasis added). 
Sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18 are both written in the permissive voice "may," and confer 
authority on peace officers to arrest a suspect for any "public offense" committed in their presence 
or, in the peace officer's discretion, to cite the suspect for any "misdemeanor or infraction" for which 
the suspect would otherwise be subject to arrest or prosecution. 
It is uncontested that Martinez committed multiple misdemeanor traffic violations in the 
agents' presence. Therefore, the agents were statutorily authorized to arrest or cite Martinez in their 
discretion under sections 77-7-2 and 77-7-18. 
Addressing Martinez' argument, the court must determine whether or not in certain 
circumstances sections 166, 167 and 169 limit the general authority of a peace office to arrest, or 
require the issuance of a citation instead of an arrest for a traffic misd emeanor. " . . . 41 -6-169 mkes 
[sic] it clear that the officer must make an arrest or issue a citation pursuant to the [sic] 41-6-166 and 
41-6-167." (Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2). The court concludes they do not. 
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In construing sections 166,167 and 169, the "primary rule ... is to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, we 
look first to the plain language of the statute. In construing a statute, we assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66. 
Moreover, u[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions 
in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 
12, ^ 17. "It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and effect. 
When a construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to 
construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid conflicts." Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770,773 
(Utah 1991). 
Sections 166, 167 and 169 presuppose that an arrest has taken place. Section 166 applies 
"[wjhenever any person is arrested for any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor." That 
section describes the procedure to be followed for appearance and setting bond once an arrest has 
been made: the arrested person "shall... be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate" in 
the enumerated circumstances. 
Section 167 further describes the post arrest procedure to be followed "whenever a person is 
[not] immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided." The phrase "as hereinbefore 
provided" can only refer to section 166, and the phrase "as hereinafter provided" in section 166(4) 
can only refer to section 167. Read together, sections 166 and 167 impose a procedural requirement 
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that persons arrested for misdemeanor traffic violations be taken to a magistrate "without 
unnecessary delay" or, where not so taken before a magistrate, given a citation and released. 
Section 169 requires that sections 166 and 167 be followed for warrantless arrests for traffic 
misdemeanor violations under chapter 6. Specifically, section 169 imposes "the procedure prescribed 
herein"-i.e., the post arrest procedures contained in sections 166 and 167-where not in conflict with 
other law. 
For these reasons, the court reads sections 166, 167 and 169 as procedural rules for peace 
officers to follow once an arrest has been made for misdemeanor traffic violations under chapter 6, 
containing neither a grant of limited authority to arrest without warrant nor a restriction or limitation 
of any such authority. Those sections are consistent with, and do not supersede, conflict with or 
restrict a peace officer's general authority to make a warrantless arrest for any public offense 
committed or attempted in the officer's presence under section 77-7-2. 
The agents' statutory authority to arrest Martinez was not restricted or limited by sections 
166,167 and 169. The arrest was therefore valid and the subsequent search was a search incident to 
arrest. 
Reasonableness of the Arrest 
Martinez also raises issues under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, which 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "He had a valid driver's license and there were no 
warrants for his arrest and was a resident of Ogden but the officers did not even attempt to issue a 
citation but instead arrested the Martinez solely for the purpose of searching him and his motorcycle 
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and therefore the arrest was illegal and the evidence obtained should be suppressed." Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof, p. 2. 
Martinez' first constitutional argument is that the "pretext doctrine" should invalidate his 
arrest. That doctrine was rejected in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) (in the case of 
temporary stops for traffic violations); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), cert, denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 476,126 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1993) (arrest for parole violation; however, the pretext doctrine was not 
squarely before the court); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (traffic stop and subsequent 
arrest of a passenger for giving false personal information to a peace officer), and State v. Harmon, 
910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995) (traffic violation outside chapter 6). 
"In attempting to apply the pretext doctrine, [defendant] argues that her arrest was 
unconstitutional because even if she 'could' have been arrested for driving on suspension, a 
reasonable officer ... 'would' not have done so. After considering our opinions in Lopez, Archuleta, 
and Pena, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, we conclude that the 'pretext arrest' analysis 
should be rejected for many of the same reasons that we rejected the 'pretext stop' analysis. The 
validity of an arrest must be analyzed on objective criteria, not on an officer's subjective motivations 
or suspicions. Inquiring into 'what a reasonable officer would do' focuses on a question that is 
falsely objective, 'fails to provide the consistency and predictability officers need,' and ignores the 
possibility that usual police practice may be unconstitutional." Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 (citations 
omitted). 
"If police have a valid right to arrest an individual for one crime, it does not matter if their 
subjective intent is in reality to collect information concerning another crime. ... In other words, if 
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the alleged prelext arrest could have taken place absent police suspicion of the defendant's 
involvement in amother crime, then the arrest is lawful.... The arrest was not rendered invalid solely 
because the officers had a separate motive for arresting him ... ." Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1238. 
Martinez5 second constitutional argument is directed to the reasonableness of his arrest. 
Martinez concedes that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation 
despite a Fourth Amendment challenge in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). "The State 
has correctly stated the law under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the 
State of Utah can interpret its constitution to provide more protection from the government then [sic] 
the United States Constitution provides, [citations omitted] Also, the legislature of the State of Utah 
is free to provide greater protection then [sic] is provided by the U.S. Constitution and that is exactly 
what 41-6-166 does by limiting when the police can arrest a person for a violation of a traffic 
offense." Defendant's Reply Memo, p. 2. Martinez attempts to distinguish Atwater "since Texas law 
provided the officer the right to arrest for that violation." Id. 
The court does not find that Martinez' arrest was unreasonable under the Utah Constitution. 
"In Lopez, we concluded that 'because the pretext doctrine is unsound, we refuse to adopt it under 
article I, section 14 . . . of the Utah Constitution.' This holding also applies to pretext arrests." 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 (citation omitted). 
In consl ruing statutes, the court will "avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant 
constitutional mandates." State v. Mohl 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995) "[W]e have a duty to 
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Under section 77-7-2, the agents had probable cause and authority to arrest Martinez for 
observed misdemeanor traffic violations. The court interprets sections 166,167 and 169 as imposing 
additional procedural requirements in connection with such arrests. Such procedures address possible 
abuses of a peace officer's discretionary arrest authority. 
"The purpose of the statute [chapter 6] is two-fold. First, it preserves the rights of a person 
arrested by insuring that he be afforded a prompt opportunity to effect his release from custody. 
Second, it prevents the arresting officer from being selective in determining before which magistrate 
the charge will be lodged and tried." Woytko, 659 P.2d at 1060 (Utah 1983). 
The reasonableness of warrantless arrests for misdemeanor traffic violations is therefore 
addressed, and Martinez' rights are preserved, in the procedures applicable to such arrests as enacted 
by the legislature in chapter 6, and specifically in sections 166,167 and 169. Accordingly, the court 
declines to invalidate arrests under the general arrest statute as applied to misdemeanor traffic 
violations, or to impose additional procedures or analysis on such arrests. 
CONCLUSION 
Martinez' motion to suppress is denied. 
Dated November 29, 2004. 
, WVfr-v-—^ 
:, Judge R. Morris 
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